{ "containers": { "cna": { "providerMetadata": { "orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09" }, "title": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) protection bypass in ResourceIsolationRequestCycleListener", "problemTypes": [ { "descriptions": [ { "description": "CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)", "lang": "en", "cweId": "CWE-352", "type": "CWE" } ] } ], "source": { "discovery": "UNKNOWN" }, "affected": [ { "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation", "product": "Apache Wicket", "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2", "packageName": "org.apache.wicket:wicket-core", "versions": [ { "status": "affected", "version": "9.1.0", "lessThanOrEqual": "9.23.0", "versionType": "semver" }, { "status": "affected", "version": "10.0.0", "lessThanOrEqual": "10.10.0", "versionType": "semver" } ], "defaultStatus": "unaffected" } ], "descriptions": [ { "value": "ResourceIsolationRequestCycleListener protects a Wicket application against cross-site\u00a0request forgery by rejecting requests that a resource isolation policy judges to come from another origin. Its default policy, FetchMetadataResourceIsolationPolicy, was derived from\u00a0a reference implementation written to guard static resources, and it inherited two\u00a0allowances that are unsafe when the thing being guarded is an action on a page:\n * Every \"simple top-level navigation\" was allowed. Any GET request carrying\u00a0Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate whose Sec-Fetch-Dest was neither object nor embed was\u00a0allowed, whatever Sec-Fetch-Site said \u2014 including cross-site. Wicket invokes component\u00a0listeners (Link.onClick(), form submits, behaviour callbacks) through ordinary GET\u00a0navigations, so a page under an attacker's control could navigate the victim's browser to a\u00a0listener URL and have that listener run inside the victim's authenticated session. Browsers\u00a0send SameSite=Lax cookies \u2014 the effective default when no SameSite attribute is set \u2014 on\u00a0cross-site top-level GET navigations, so the victim's session cookie accompanied the\u00a0request.\n * Sec-Fetch-Site: same-site was allowed unconditionally. That value means the same\u00a0registrable domain and scheme but a different origin \u2014 another subdomain or another\u00a0port. Any sibling origin could therefore invoke any listener by any method, POST form\u00a0submits included, and cookies are always sent on same-site requests regardless of\u00a0SameSite. A hostile sibling origin obtained through a subdomain takeover, through\u00a0delegated user content, or through an XSS elsewhere on the site could act as the\u00a0authenticated user.\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 9.24.0 or 10.11.0, which fix the issue.\nAffected versions\n\n * Apache Wicket 9.1.0 through 9.23.0\n * Apache Wicket 10.0.0 through 10.10.0\n\n\n\nNot affected\n\nAny release older than 9.1.0:\n * Apache Wicket 8.x (8.0.0 through 8.17.0). The resource isolation classes do not exist in\u00a0the 8.x line, which offers only the Origin/Referer-based\u00a0CsrfPreventionRequestCycleListener. No 8.x release requires a fix.\n * Apache Wicket 9.0.0. ResourceIsolationRequestCycleListener\u00a0and FetchMetadataResourceIsolationPolicy were introduced by WICKET-6786 and first shipped\u00a0in 9.1.0 (released 2020-10-07).", "lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [ { "type": "text/html", "base64": false, "value": "ResourceIsolationRequestCycleListener protects a Wicket application against cross-site request forgery by rejecting requests that a resource isolation policy judges to come from another origin. Its default policy, FetchMetadataResourceIsolationPolicy, was derived from a reference implementation written to guard static resources, and it inherited two allowances that are unsafe when the thing being guarded is an action on a page:
  1. Every \"simple top-level navigation\" was allowed. Any GET request carrying Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate whose Sec-Fetch-Dest was neither object nor embed was allowed, whatever Sec-Fetch-Site said \u2014 including cross-site. Wicket invokes component listeners (Link.onClick(), form submits, behaviour callbacks) through ordinary GET navigations, so a page under an attacker's control could navigate the victim's browser to a listener URL and have that listener run inside the victim's authenticated session. Browsers send SameSite=Lax cookies \u2014 the effective default when no SameSite attribute is set \u2014 on cross-site top-level GET navigations, so the victim's session cookie accompanied the request.
  2. Sec-Fetch-Site: same-site was allowed unconditionally. That value means the same registrable domain and scheme but a different origin \u2014 another subdomain or another port. Any sibling origin could therefore invoke any listener by any method, POST form submits included, and cookies are always sent on same-site requests regardless of SameSite. A hostile sibling origin obtained through a subdomain takeover, through delegated user content, or through an XSS elsewhere on the site could act as the authenticated user.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.24.0 or 10.11.0, which fix the issue.

Affected versions

\n\n\n

Not affected

\n\nAny release older than 9.1.0:
" } ] } ], "references": [ { "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/42d22kyz38td5zkqybw9fwdrvyfd5y62", "tags": [ "vendor-advisory" ] } ], "metrics": [ { "other": { "type": "Textual description of severity", "content": { "text": "moderate" } }, "scenarios": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL" } ] } ], "credits": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "Darren Carreras", "type": "finder" }, { "lang": "en", "value": "Andre Kropp (Nexory)", "type": "finder" } ], "x_generator": { "engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0" } } }, "cveMetadata": { "cveId": "CVE-2026-71378", "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09", "serial": 1, "state": "PUBLISHED" }, "dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.1" }