{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "providerMetadata": {
        "orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09"
      },
      "title": "Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Unsanitized Topology Metadata in Storm UI",
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "description": "CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')",
              "lang": "en",
              "cweId": "CWE-79",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "affected": [
        {
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "product": "Apache Storm UI",
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2/",
          "packageName": "org.apache.storm:storm-webapp",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "lessThan": "2.8.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "value": "Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Unsanitized Topology Metadata in Apache Storm UI\n\n\nVersions Affected: before 2.8.6\n\n\nDescription: The Storm UI visualization component interpolates topology metadata including component IDs, stream names, and grouping values directly into HTML via innerHTML in parseNode() and parseEdge() without sanitization at any layer. An authenticated user with topology submission rights could craft a topology containing malicious HTML/JavaScript in component identifiers (e.g., a bolt ID containing an onerror event handler). This payload flows through Nimbus \u2192 Thrift \u2192 the Visualization API \u2192 vis.js tooltip rendering, resulting in stored cross-site scripting.\u00a0\n\nIn multi-tenant deployments where topology submission is available to less-trusted users but the UI is accessed by operators or administrators, this enables privilege escalation through script execution in an admin's browser session.\n\n\nMitigation:\u00a02.x users should upgrade to 2.8.6. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should monkey-patch the parseNode() and parseEdge() functions in the visualization JavaScript file to HTML-escape all API-supplied values including nodeId, :capacity, :latency, :component, :stream, and :grouping\u00a0before interpolation into tooltip HTML strings, and should additionally restrict topology submission to trusted users via Nimbus ACLs as a defense-in-depth measure.\u00a0A guide on how to do this is available in the release notes of 2.8.6.\n\nCredit: This issue was discovered while investigating another report by K.",
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "type": "text/html",
              "base64": false,
              "value": "<p><strong>Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Unsanitized Topology Metadata in Apache Storm UI</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Versions Affected:</strong> before 2.8.6</p>\n<p><strong>Description:</strong> The Storm UI visualization component interpolates topology metadata including component IDs, stream names, and grouping values directly into HTML via <code>innerHTML</code> in <code>parseNode()</code> and <code>parseEdge()</code> without sanitization at any layer. An authenticated user with topology submission rights could craft a topology containing malicious HTML/JavaScript in component identifiers (e.g., a bolt ID containing an <code>onerror</code> event handler). This payload flows through Nimbus \u2192 Thrift \u2192 the Visualization API \u2192 vis.js tooltip rendering, resulting in stored cross-site scripting.&nbsp;</p><p>In multi-tenant deployments where topology submission is available to less-trusted users but the UI is accessed by operators or administrators, this enables privilege escalation through script execution in an admin's browser session.</p>\n<p><strong>Mitigation:</strong>&nbsp;2.x users should upgrade to 2.8.6. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should monkey-patch the <code>parseNode()</code> and <code>parseEdge()</code> functions in the visualization JavaScript file to HTML-escape all API-supplied values including <code>nodeId</code>, <code>:capacity</code>, <code>:latency</code>, <code>:component</code>, <code>:stream</code>, and <code>:grouping</code>&nbsp;before interpolation into tooltip HTML strings, and should additionally restrict topology submission to trusted users via Nimbus ACLs as a defense-in-depth measure.&nbsp;A guide on how to do this is available in the release notes of 2.8.6.</p><b>Credit:</b> This issue was discovered while investigating another report by K.<br>"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://storm.apache.org/2026/04/12/storm286-released.html",
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "other": {
            "type": "Textual description of severity",
            "content": {
              "text": "moderate"
            }
          }
        }
      ],
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-35565",
    "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
    "serial": 1,
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.1"
}