{ "containers": { "cna": { "affected": [ { "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "Apache Karaf", "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation", "versions": [ { "lessThan": "4.4.12", "status": "affected", "version": "0", "versionType": "semver" } ] } ], "credits": [ { "lang": "en", "type": "reporter", "value": "Rin Ray " } ], "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [ { "base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.

The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role.

config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.

Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.

By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier.

Mitigation

Add install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.
" } ], "value": "Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl..cfg).\u00a0SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity()\u00a0resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open:\u00a0ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH\u00a0sets\u00a0passCheck = true. The safety valve for this,\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in\u00a0etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.\n\n\nThe shipped\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config\u00a0ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into\u00a0instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no\u00a0install\u00a0entry. It restricts\u00a0delete\u00a0to\u00a0admin, restricts\u00a0edit/property-*/update\u00a0on the\u00a0jmx.acl.*,\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.*\u00a0and\u00a0org.apache.karaf.service.acl.*\u00a0PIDs to\u00a0admin, and allows\u00a0manager\u00a0for everything else, but\u00a0config:install\u00a0was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the\u00a0viewer\u00a0role.\n\n\n\n\nconfig:install \u00a0fetches\u00a0url\u00a0and writes it into\u00a0${karaf.etc}\u00a0as\u00a0finalname. It calls\u00a0PathUtils.checkWithin()\u00a0to block\u00a0..\u00a0traversal outside\u00a0karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships:\u00a0users.properties,\u00a0keys.properties,\u00a0host.key, and all\u00a0org.apache.karaf.*.acl.*\u00a0files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With\u00a0-o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.\n\n\n\n\nBecause\u00a0felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc}\u00a0(etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any\u00a0.cfg\u00a0file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.\n\n\n\n\nBy contrast,\u00a0bundle:install,\u00a0feature:install\u00a0and\u00a0kar:install\u00a0are all\u00a0admin-only in their own ACLs, and\u00a0config:delete\u00a0is\u00a0admin\u00a0in this same ACL,\u00a0config:install\u00a0was the outlier.\n\nMitigationAdd\u00a0install = admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg\u00a0(create the file is absent), and/or set\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/system.properties\u00a0(and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default." } ], "metrics": [ { "other": { "content": { "text": "moderate" }, "type": "Textual description of severity" }, "scenarios": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL" } ] } ], "problemTypes": [ { "descriptions": [ { "cweId": "CWE-862", "description": "CWE-862", "lang": "en", "type": "CWE" } ] } ], "providerMetadata": { "orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09" }, "references": [ { "tags": [ "vendor-advisory" ], "url": "https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt" } ], "source": { "discovery": "EXTERNAL" }, "title": "config:install missing ACL entry allows privilege escalation to admin", "x_generator": { "engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.3" } } }, "cveMetadata": { "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09", "cveId": "CVE-2026-91085", "serial": 1, "state": "PUBLISHED" }, "dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.0" }