{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "providerMetadata": {
        "orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09"
      },
      "title": "Permissive default ObjectInputFilter pattern admits java.net.** and enables DNS-based information disclosure",
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "description": "CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data",
              "lang": "en",
              "cweId": "CWE-502",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "affected": [
        {
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "product": "Apache Camel",
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2",
          "packageName": "org.apache.camel:camel",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.14.0",
              "lessThan": "4.14.8",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.15.0",
              "lessThan": "4.18.3",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.19.0",
              "lessThan": "4.21.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "value": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering ('java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*', or the no-'javax.**' variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive 'java.**' glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that calls hashCode on its elements) containing java.net.URL keys causes the JVM to issue DNS queries to the attacker-supplied host during the deserialization side-effect. The class-level filter check passes because the resulting object's class (HashMap) is allow-listed; the DNS query is observable on an attacker-controlled DNS server, providing an out-of-band side channel. The exposure is highest on the camel-jms family because JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms invokes ObjectMessage.getObject() unconditionally when mapJmsMessage=true (default). Affected components: camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-amqp, camel-mina, camel-netty, camel-netty-http, camel-vertx-http, camel-infinispan, and the aggregation repository components camel-leveldb, camel-cassandraql, camel-consul, camel-sql (JDBC aggregation repository).\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.14.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to a version that contains the CAMEL-23372 fix once available: 4.21.0 for the 4.21.x line, 4.18.3 for the 4.18.x line, and 4.14.8 for the 4.14.x line. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a JMS-provider-side allow-list (Apache ActiveMQ Artemis 'deserializationAllowList' / 'deserializationDenyList', Apache ActiveMQ Classic 'org.apache.activemq.SERIALIZABLE_PACKAGES') as the primary mitigation, and/or override the in-code default via the endpoint-level 'deserializationFilter' option or the JVM-wide '-Djdk.serialFilter' system property with an explicit deny: '!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*' (or '!java.net.**;java.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*' for the aggregation-repository components, which do not include javax.**).",
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "type": "text/html",
              "base64": false,
              "value": "<p>Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.</p>The default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering ('java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*', or the no-'javax.**' variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive 'java.**' glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that calls hashCode on its elements) containing java.net.URL keys causes the JVM to issue DNS queries to the attacker-supplied host during the deserialization side-effect. The class-level filter check passes because the resulting object's class (HashMap) is allow-listed; the DNS query is observable on an attacker-controlled DNS server, providing an out-of-band side channel. The exposure is highest on the camel-jms family because JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms invokes ObjectMessage.getObject() unconditionally when mapJmsMessage=true (default). Affected components: camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-amqp, camel-mina, camel-netty, camel-netty-http, camel-vertx-http, camel-infinispan, and the aggregation repository components camel-leveldb, camel-cassandraql, camel-consul, camel-sql (JDBC aggregation repository).<br><p>This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.14.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.</p><p>Users are recommended to upgrade to a version that contains the CAMEL-23372 fix once available: 4.21.0 for the 4.21.x line, 4.18.3 for the 4.18.x line, and 4.14.8 for the 4.14.x line. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a JMS-provider-side allow-list (Apache ActiveMQ Artemis 'deserializationAllowList' / 'deserializationDenyList', Apache ActiveMQ Classic 'org.apache.activemq.SERIALIZABLE_PACKAGES') as the primary mitigation, and/or override the in-code default via the endpoint-level 'deserializationFilter' option or the JVM-wide '-Djdk.serialFilter' system property with an explicit deny: '!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*' (or '!java.net.**;java.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*' for the aggregation-repository components, which do not include javax.**).</p>"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-42527.html",
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "other": {
            "type": "Textual description of severity",
            "content": {
              "text": "moderate"
            }
          }
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Venkatraman Kumar from Securin",
          "type": "finder"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Yu Bao from Paypal",
          "type": "finder"
        }
      ],
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-42527",
    "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
    "serial": 1,
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.1"
}