{"schema_version": "1.6.1", "id": "CVE-2026-81930", "summary": "Unvalidated account field redirects SQL API bearer token off-domain", "details": "Apache Airflow's Snowflake provider did not validate the connection's `account` and `region` fields before interpolating them into request URLs. The SQL API endpoint is built as `https://{account}.snowflakecomputing.com/api/v2/statements`, so an `account` value containing `/`, `?` or `#` demotes the intended domain to a path, query or fragment and leaves the attacker in control of the request host.\n\nThe provider sends that request with an `Authorization: Bearer` header carrying a JWT minted from the connection's private key, or the configured OAuth or programmatic access token. A user who can edit the Snowflake connection but cannot read its secrets — Airflow gives connection-configuration users write-only access to stored credentials, and a `private_key_file` lives on the worker rather than in the connection — can therefore cause a valid token for the account to be delivered to a host of their choosing and replay it against the genuine Snowflake endpoint. No Dag-authoring ability is required: the attacker edits the connection and waits for an existing Dag to use it. The same unvalidated value was also used to build the OAuth token-request URL and the Cortex Agent base URL.\n\nAffects deployments where Snowflake connections are editable by users who are not trusted with the connection's credentials. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow-providers-snowflake` `6.18.0` or later, which rejects `account` and `region` values containing anything other than letters, digits, `.`, `_` and `-` in every URL the provider builds from them.", "affected": [{"ranges": [{"type": "SEMVER", "events": [{"introduced": "0"}, {"fixed": "6.18.0"}]}]}], "references": [{"type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/72174"}, {"type": "WEB", "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/324jm2mxd5x4nq85jfw1ostz94xwzrmk"}]}