{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "providerMetadata": {
        "orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09"
      },
      "title": "Unguarded import_string() of airflow_exc_ser / base_exc_ser exception nodes in BaseSerialization.deserialize enables DAG-author RCE on Scheduler / API Server",
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "description": "CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data",
              "lang": "en",
              "cweId": "CWE-502",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "affected": [
        {
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "product": "Apache Airflow",
          "collectionURL": "https://pypi.python.org",
          "packageName": "apache-airflow",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3.0.0",
              "lessThan": "3.3.1",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "value": "Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`.",
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "type": "text/html",
              "base64": false,
              "value": "Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/68511",
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ]
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-33264",
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ]
        },
        {
          "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/t81p688t15jozxsng8521o60nh2kfsos",
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "other": {
            "type": "Textual description of severity",
            "content": {
              "text": "important"
            }
          }
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Jan Kahmen (turingpoint), GitHub: @kah-ja",
          "type": "finder"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Jarek Potiuk",
          "type": "remediation developer"
        }
      ],
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "airflow-s/generate_cve_json.py"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-58076",
    "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
    "serial": 1,
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.1"
}